We assess the role of both accruals manipulation (AM) and real activities manipulation (RAM) in inducing overvaluation at the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO).Our results reveal that earnings management is most closely and predictably linked with post-SEO stock market under-performance when it is driven by RAM. The results suggest that overvaluation at the time of the SEO is more likely when managers actively engage in more opaque channels to overstate earnings; accordingly managers exhibit a greater propensity to engage in RAM at the time of SEOs, even though RAM is more costly in the long run.. Thus, the focus in prior research on examining the influence of abnormal accruals on SEO overvaluation appears incomplete at best, since most existing studies do not consider the role of RAM in misleading investors at a time when firms are subject to substantial scrutiny.
Introduction
Management is an important source of the financial information to investors. The voluminous earnings management literature demonstrates that managers misrepresent, typically positively, the firm's financial information in the hope of skewing the firm's stock market valuation upward. The extent to which earnings management strategies succeed in misleading investors depends on their relative opacity, or the degree to which external investors can detect and unravel their effects on earnings. Earnings management can occur through two channels: accruals management (AM) and real activities management (RAM). We expect earnings management strategies to differ in their opacity, and examine whether the overvaluation they induce reflects this difference.
Our primary result is that evidence of overvaluation at the time of a seasoned equity offering (SEO) is much more robust among firms engaging in real activities management to overstate earnings. Accruals management, on the other hand, is reliably associated with negative future returns only when it is simultaneously accompanied by real activities management. The result is particularly surprising since both real and accrual earnings management strategies (both independently and in conjunction) are associated negatively with future operating performance.
Our findings highlight that investors' inability to detect earnings management and assess its consequence for future performance is more severe when real activities are used to manage earnings.
Accruals-based earnings management involves managers' intervention in the financial
reporting process via the exercise of their discretion and judgment regarding accounting choices.
Importantly, accruals management tends to misrepresent the underlying operations of the firm in the books, but does not generally involve altering operations themselves. Real activities manipulation, on the other hand, entails departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers' desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations (Roychowdhury, 2006) .
Real activities manipulation can assume many forms, including under-investment in research and development (R&D), advertising, and employee training, all for the purpose of meeting short-term goals (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005, Roychowdhury, 2006) . Marketing strategies, tactics, and budgets are often at the center of implementing real activity-based earnings management as well (Moorman, Wies, Mizik and Spencer, 2012, Chapman and Steenburgh, 2009 ). Myopic real actions undertaken to boost current earnings can be detrimental to a firm's long-term profitability and competitiveness, possibly more so than accruals management.
Nevertheless, in anonymous surveys (for example, Graham, et al., 2005) , managers indicate a preference for real activities-based earnings management.
Managers possibly prefer real activities based earnings management because it is easier to camouflage as "normal" compared to accruals-based earnings management. Auditors look for whether firms' accounting practices meet generally accepted principles (GAAP). Detectable departures from GAAP can impose substantial costs on firms, managers, and auditors via regulatory investigations, restatements, and personal penalties (Dechow et al., 1996 , Feroz et al., 1991 , and Palmrose et al., 2004 . Real activities-based management, in contrast, manifests from managers' investment and operating decisions. Shareholders delegate to managers the discretion over investment decisions because the latter possess superior information and judgment about such decisions relative to external stakeholders. Thus, the detection of RAM arguably presents a greater challenge for investors than that of accruals management. Consistent with this, Cohen Dey and Lys (2008) document evidence suggesting that the more stringent regulatory environment after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 is actually associated with an increase in real activities management and a decline in accruals management.
SEOs provide a useful setting for assessing the capital market consequences of earnings inflation via real activities or accruals. An SEO is a well-identified period of significantlyincreased emphasis on a firm's stock price. Any overvaluation at the time of an SEO would result in a wealth transfer from prospective shareholders to the firm and current shareholders. There is considerable literature focusing on whether stock prices are inflated at the time of an SEO (Loughran and Ritter, 1995) and whether managers attempt to overstate earnings during the SEO year with adverse consequences for post-SEO operating performance (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998 , Rangan, 1998 , Cohen and Zarowin, 2010 . A key question in the literature has been whether managers' attempts to misrepresent earnings are actually successful in misleading shareholders at the time of the SEO and thus responsible for inflated stock prices. During equity issues, firms are subject to considerable scrutiny by financial analysts and the investing community (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008) . Thus, any attempt by managers to overstate earnings and mislead shareholders, in order to succeed, has to be relatively opaque in the face of such scrutiny. Hence the relative opacity of managing earnings via real activities versus accruals can play a significant role at the time of SEOs.
An important feature of our research design is that it incorporates multiple possible scenarios involving earnings management: managers in SEO firms can engage in real activities management, or accruals management or both simultaneously. To better identify SEO firms that engage in earnings management with the intent to overstate earnings, we consider whether the firms exhibit evidence of RAM and/or AM in conjunction with whether the firms report earnings that were above their expected levels.
Our first analysis indicates that the incidence of firms attempting to overstate earnings via RAM is much higher in SEO years than in non-SEO years. Importantly, the relative incidence of firms engaging solely in accruals management to inflate earnings is similar in SEO and non-SEO years. The results indicate that managers have an increased propensity in SEO years to engage in RAM. In subsequent analysis, we examine the operating performance of SEO firms in the years following the SEO. We find that firms exhibiting evidence of RAM to overstate earnings experience negative operating performance relative to their Barber and Lyon matched counterparts in each of the three years following the SEO. Firms relying solely on accruals (but not real activities) to overstate earnings at the time of the SEO exhibit evidence of negative operating performance in future years as well, although not as severe as those engaging in RAM. Our results are largely consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) , although they do not consider whether RAM and AM occurred independently or in conjunction, and whether the firm was actually successful in overstating earnings.
Our primary returns-based tests reveal that firms manipulating both real activities and accruals to generate positive earnings surprises experience consistently negative returns in each of the three years following the SEO. Future price performance is also significantly negative over each of the three post-SEO years for firms reporting engaging in real activities management but not accruals management to overstate earnings. For firms managing accruals but not real activities to inflate earnings, mean post-SEO returns are not significantly negative; median returns are significantly negative only in the second year following the SEO. Overall, the results suggest that SEO overvaluation is primarily driven by managers' attempts to overstate earnings via their real actions.
Existing evidence linking earnings management to mispricing has been questioned at least in part based on empirical research design flaws that induce errors in the risk-adjusted returns and/or the earnings management measures. We address several empirical concerns through the use of more refined measures of accruals-based and real activities-based measures of earnings management, and Barber-and-Lyon matched risk-adjusted returns. Importantly, our measures of earnings management incorporate the benefit of hindsight because in constructing them we take advantage of data extending beyond the SEO. Thus, the overvaluation we document can be interpreted as resulting from managerial decisions at the time of the SEO that are visible to investors (via their consequences) only ex post. To that extent, the post-SEO return underperformance is not indicative of a trading rule that can be constructed at the time of the SEO; rather it is reflective of overvaluation with respect to managers' private information regarding earnings management.
The link we establish between real activities-based earnings management and SEO overvaluation is important in the context of existing literature. Zang (2011) proposes that the relative extent to which managers engage in real activities manipulation versus accruals manipulation reflect the costs associated with either strategy. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) report (and we confirm) that managing earnings at the time of the SEO via real activities is more costly in the long run than doing so via accruals. In view of this literature, it is intriguing that SEO firms are on average more likely to engage in RAM, even though the long-run costs thereof appear higher. Our returns-based tests suggest an explanation: under the intense capitals-market scrutiny that characterizes SEOs, managers are more likely to engage in RAM because it is more "effective" in misleading investors than accruals management. The results also point to the opacity of RAM as a potential explanation for the unconditional preference that managers repeatedly indicate in anonymous surveys (Bruns and Merchant, 1990, Graham, et al., 2005, Libby and  Lindsay 2007) for managing earnings via real activities rather than accruals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant literature and our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our research methods and data. Our primary results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss additional analysis, and present a summary discussion of our findings in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis Development and Research Design
We study accruals-based and real activities-based earnings management and stock price performance of firms making seasoned equity offerings (SEO). Managers arguably have strong incentives to inflate current stock price by managing earnings at the time of issuing additional equity via an SEO. Nevertheless, the evidence on earnings management leading up to an SEO and its link to mispricing is mixed, as discussed in greater detail below.
Earnings inflation at the time of an SEO and the response of financial markets
While managers are generally expected to have an interest in maintaining high stock price, certain firm-specific events tend to enhance the emphasis, to the point that they may consider manipulating the information flow to the market in an attempt to induce high valuations. An SEO is an event where the firm's stock price is of particular interest to managers. It provides current shareholders an opportunity to transfer wealth from prospective shareholders. Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) emphasize the motivation for earnings inflation when a firm is raising capital, as a way to obtain more favorable terms. Firms undertake an SEO to, among other objectives, collect new capital for funding real growth opportunities, acquire other firms, retire existing debt obligations, and/or repurchase preferred stock. The amount of capital collected by a firm at the time of an SEO depends on its stock price on the day of the offering. To the extent that stock valuations depend at least in part on reported earnings, managers have incentives to inflate earnings in order to maximize SEO proceeds.
Because of some of their unique characteristics and properties, SEOs have generated considerable research interest. SEO research can be categorized into three distinct streams. The first stream highlights the SEO pricing anomaly (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995, Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995) . These studies report that SEO firms exhibit below-average risk-adjusted stock returns in the years following an SEO. A second stream of literature focuses on the role of earnings management measured via "abnormal" accounting accruals as the source of the mispricing (e.g., Teoh at al., 1998 , Rangan, 1998 , DuCharme et al., 2004 . These studies show that SEO firms with unusually large discretionary accruals (likely resulting from an attempt to inflate reported earnings) experience the lowest post-SEO abnormal stock returns. The third stream of research challenges the conclusions in prior studies regarding SEO underperformance, based on concerns related to the estimation of expected returns, specifically, the "bad model problem" and the "small firm effect" (e.g., Fama, 1998 , Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000 ), 2000 , Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000 , and Shivakumar, 2000) . These studies argue that post-SEO underperformance is not anomalous, and instead can be explained by improper modeling of risk.
Studies have also questioned the evidence of earnings management by SEO firms, arguing that the models for explaining accruals in earlier studies are flawed (Collins and Hribar, 2002) .
Earnings inflation via accruals versus real activities
Recent literature suggests that possible earnings management strategies at the time of SEO issuance and in other settings are not necessarily limited to overstatement of accruals, but can include manipulation of real activities (Roychowdhury, 2006 , Mizik and Jacobson, 2007 , Zang 2011 , Gunny, 2010 , and Cohen and Zarowin, 2010 , Badertscher, 2011 . However, the role of real activity versus accrual earnings management in mispricing remains unexamined. This seems to be a crucial gap in the literature. Equity offerings represent events during which the firm is subject to substantial scrutiny by the capital markets, including investors, analysts and even regulators. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) make this point in the context of IPOs. If managers do indeed engage in earnings management, they are more likely to achieve their objective of inducing overvaluation with strategies that have a low probability of detection.
Real operations are more firmly within the domain of expertise of managers rather than investors and/or fiduciary agents such as auditors. While GAAP provides a framework for "acceptable" accounting principles that are enforced by regulatory agencies such as the SEC, no such framework for real operations exists. Managers are expected to exercise their judgment to determine the best course of action that is appropriate given the economic circumstances. This provides managers incentives to engage in real activities management in lieu of, or in addition to, accruals manipulation to overstate earnings at the time of an SEO. Further, RAM is potentially costlier for firms in the long run than accruals management (see, for example, Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Thus, for the subset of firms that engages in real activities management, the possible market overvaluation at the time of the SEO and the subsequent correction in mispricing can be particularly severe.
Our research does not focus just on managers' attempts to inflate reported earnings through either accruals or real activity manipulation in isolation. Instead, we assess whether earnings management via accruals and real activities takes place at the same time, and examine their relative economic consequence. We expect any evidence of SEO overvaluation to be the most pronounced among firms that engage in real activities manipulation, given its greater opacity.
Thus our primary hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis: Firms that generate positive earnings surprises via real activity manipulation exhibit negative post-SEO stock return performance.
III. Methodology and Data

Measuring Real Activities Management
As Graham Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) and Roychowdhury (2006) discuss, there are a number of possible real activity management strategies available to managers. The particular type of real activity management we focus on is an abnormal reduction in research and development expenditures (R&D). R&D expenditures are generally incurred with the objective of enhancing future competitiveness and profitability but GAAP requires that they be expensed as incurred. A reduction in R&D thus provides a direct trade-off between contemporaneous earnings and future competitiveness, and in that sense is often termed "myopic" (see Bushee 1998) . Further, unlike some strategies such as price discounting and overproduction, an opportunistic reduction in R&D not only increases earnings, but also enables a firm to report higher profit margins and cash flow from operations (see Roychowdhury, 2006) , firm parameters that are likely to be in focus when a firm issues an SEO. Indeed, Darrough and Rangan (2005) report results suggesting that firms opportunistically reduce R&D spending in the year of an initial public offering (IPO), although they do not examine the valuation consequences thereof.
We use a panel data time series specification to model R&D expenditures. We find that R&D series is well approximated by the following fixed effects first-order autoregressive panel data model including lagged sales and adjusted for firm-specific and time-period-specific effects:
R&D it is the value of the size-adjusted R&D series to be modeled for firm i at time period t, R&D it-1 is its lagged value, Sales it-1 is the value of size-adjusted Sales series for firm i at time period t-1, Time(τ) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if year is τ and 0 otherwise. Equation [1] indicates that the R&D series depends on a firm-specific level ( rd i ), the value of R&D in the previous period, the level of sales in the previous period, and the economy-wide mean of the series in a given year (  ). The coefficient  rd i is the firm-specific constant capturing individual firmspecific effects and  rd is the first-order autoregressive coefficient depicting the persistence of the R&D series. We use the fixed-effects instrumental variable estimation (Anderson and Hsiao 1982) to recover autoregressive coefficient  rd and lagged sales coefficient  Sales  in the presence of a fixed effect  rd i .
Our estimation technique allows for data from years beyond the SEO to be incorporated in the measurement of earnings management at the time of the SEO. The technique we employ has two distinct advantages. First it corrects for any model misspecification issues that would habitually misclassify certain firms as exhibiting unusually low (or high) R&D due to the characteristics of their operating environment and/or the nature of their business. These factors tend to induce considerable autocorrelation in the measures of earnings management, particularly those involving real activities. For example, the first-order autocorrelation in abnormal R&D is 0.48 in our sample. By taking advantage of the full time series available for every firm, our method allows for the possibility that there may not be enough data available at the time of the SEO to detect real activities that are significant departures from the firm's normal operations.
Second, our technique has the intuitively appealing feature that it yields measures of earnings management that cannot necessarily be constructed at the time of the SEO and thus, would be opaque to investors.
Measuring Accruals Management
We use the modified Jones model augmented for net income (Kothari et al., 2005) to compute abnormal accruals. Total accruals are defined as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current liabilities net of the current portion of long-term debt, minus depreciation and amortization, divided by lagged total assets.
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We model total accruals as:
TA it is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, Assets it-1 is lagged total assets, ΔSales it is change in sales net of accounts receivable scaled by lagged total assets, PPE it is net property, plant, and equipment scaled by lagged total assets, and NetIncome it is net income scaled by lagged total assets. Abnormal accruals are the difference between the actual and the predicted value of total accruals. The results of all our subsequent analyses are not sensitive to alternative abnormal accrual measures, e.g., Jones or modified-Jones models (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) .
Models for normal accruals can be misspecified, in that they yield habitually high (or low) abnormal accruals for specific firms. To address this possibility, we adjust for firm fixed effects in our estimation, exploiting the entire time series available for every firm for the adjustment. We do not correct for autocorrelation in abnormal accruals, since accruals that are truly discretionary or 3 Total Accruals t = "abnormal" are expected to reverse in future periods. Indeed the in-sample first-order autocorrelation in abnormal accruals (after adjusting for firm fixed effects) is economically small but significantly negative, with the correlation coefficient being -0.05.
Measuring Earnings Surprise
Earnings surprises are incorporated in our research design to capture whether firms report earnings that in the SEO year exceed the level that one would expect given their time-series record. Similar to R&D, we use a panel data time-series specification to model earnings, specifically return-on-assets (ROA). For computing ROA, we use operating income before depreciation, to ensure a common definition of earnings across all firms. To avoid imposing further data requirements, we use a time-series model of earnings, rather than analyst forecasts as proxies for the market's expectations of earnings. 4 We find that ROA series is well-approximated by a fixed effects first-order autoregressive panel data model adjusted for firm-specific and timeperiod-specific effects (Arellano, 2003) . That is, we use a model of the following form:
where ROA it is the value of the ROA series to be modeled for firm i at time period t, ROA it-1 is its lagged value, Time(τ) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if year is τ and 0 otherwise.
Equation [3] indicates that the series depends on a firm-specific amount ( roa i ), the value of the series in the previous period, and the economy-wide mean of the series in a given year (  ). The coefficient  roa i is the firm-specific constant capturing individual firm-specific effects and  roa is the first-order autoregressive coefficient depicting the persistence of the ROA series. We use the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) procedure to estimate autoregressive coefficient  roa in the presence of a fixed effect  roa i . Sensitivity tests confirm that Model 1 provides a better depiction of the series than some commonly used alternative specifications nested within Model 1 (e.g., an AR(1) model with no fixed effects or a random walk model). The simpler models that ignore firm-specific fixed effects do not depict the behavior of the series as well as Model 1. They lead to systematic misclassification of some firms as constantly falling above or below the expected level of the series since in these models the firm-specific constant is incorporated in the forecast error. As a result, conclusions based on these restricted models are biased toward not finding support for our hypothesis. Further, more complex forecasting models for ROA (e.g., fixed-effects panel AR(2) or VAR (2)) do not provide any improvement over the fixed-effects AR(1) specification of Model 1 in aiding our ability to identify RAM. Therefore, we chose to work with and present the results from the more parsimonious Model 1.
Measuring Abnormal Stock Returns
A major concern in the literature has been that all expected return models exhibit problems in depicting long-term average returns. For example, past research highlights that i) SEO risk characteristics differ from non-SEO firms (e.g., Eckbo et al., 2000) and ii) existing asset pricing models "have systematic problems explaining the average returns on categories of small stocks" (Fama 1998, p. 296) . Analysis seeking to correct for these considerations has led to research suggesting that the "new issues puzzle," e.g., the apparent mispricing of SEOs reported in previous studies, can be explained by lack of proper controls for risk (e.g., Brav et al., 2000 , Eckbo et al., 2000 , and Shivakumar, 2000 .
Our analysis limits a number of issues associated with "the bad model problem."
Following arguments made in Shivakumar (2000), we control for differences in expected return among firms by using the Barber and Lyon (1997) approach, which involves matching sample firms to control firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios. However, our approach differs from that employed in previous research, in that we match based on post-issuance rather than preissuance characteristics. This further reduces the complications associated with the SEO potentially changing the risk characteristics of the firm (Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino, 2006) .
Following Barber and Lyon (1997) , the control firm is chosen among all firms in the same 2-digit SIC group not issuing SEOs and with a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm and whose book-to-market ratio is closest to that of the sample firm.
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We then calculate abnormal returns as the difference in one, two, and three-year-ahead stock returns for a firm undertaking an SEO versus the returns for the matched benchmark firm. 
Research Design
A key feature of our study is that we allow for the possibility that firms engaging in earnings management may do so via both accruals and real activities. This is important because (a) managers can engage in both means of earnings management simultaneously; and (b) real activity management can have accrual consequences as well.
In testing our hypotheses, we sort independently on the signs of (a) abnormal R&D ( In preliminary analysis, we examine whether the frequency of firms in any one group is significantly different in SEO years relative to non-SEO years. For example, if managers have incentives to inflate earnings prior to an SEO and they perceive RAM as being more "opaque" to the market, then we should observe a higher frequency of firms in groups 3 and 4 in an SEO year than in the non-SEO years. In subsequent analysis, we test whether SEO overvaluation is indeed associated with earnings management and its type by estimating annual abnormal stock returns up to three years following the SEO and studying when the returns are significantly more negative.
To examine the evolution of the risk-adjusted "abnormal" returns for our eight groups we estimate the following model for years one through three after the SEO:
abnStkR i +k| is the k-period ahead (i.e., future multi-period) risk-adjusted cumulative stock return for firm i, with an SEO occurring at time , and I(g) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the firm is in group g and 0 otherwise. Under the null of proper valuation at the time of the SEO, the future-term abnormal returns for all groups should not differ from zero, and no differences in the post-SEO stock returns should exist for any group of firms ( g (k) = 0 for g=1 to 8). To examine whether firms generating positive earnings surprises via both accruals and real activities manipulation underperform in the post-SEO periods, we would test whether  3 (k) < 0.
Similar tests can be performed for each group.
Data
We use three different sources to compile the dataset for testing our hypotheses. (Cohen, et al. 2008 ). To abstract from complexities induced by the enactment of SOX in 2002, we exclude financial, but not return data for years following 2001. We do not require that all accounting and stock return data be available for a firm's inclusion in the sample, in order to minimize any potential survivorship bias and to preserve degrees of freedom.
The actual sample size varies across the estimating models depending on the test procedure and the variables used in the analysis.
As shown in Table 1 Panel A, firms undertook SEOs throughout the period, but significant year-to-year variation in the number of SEOs exists. Further, SEOs were issued across a broad range of industries: Table 1 Panel B presents the distribution of SEOs in the final sample by industry. We do not exclude any industries from the dataset used for the analysis. Later we reestimate our tests excluding utilities and financial companies, and find results corresponding closely to those we report. Table 1 Panel C provides descriptive statistics and variable definitions for the data items used in the analysis along with respective COMPUSTAT data item numbers. We use operating income before depreciation divided by assets as our measure of size-adjusted earnings (ROA).
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The real activity of interest is R&D expenditure divided by total assets (R&D intensity).
IV. Empirical Analysis
The first step in our analysis involves estimating models for R&D intensity, accruals, and ROA to predict expected levels, and obtain the "unexpected" residuals (i.e., deviations of the actual value of the series from the value that would have been expected based on the firm's past values of the series). Table 2 Panel A reports the results for R&D intensity and ROA, which are modeled using similar specifications. We find that the R&D and ROA series exhibit considerable and similar amounts of persistence, ROÂ  = 0.48 and RD  = 0.50. The models imply that deviations of R&D and ROA from the respective firm-specific means do not last indefinitely (we test for and find no unit roots), nor do they dissipate immediately. Rather, these deviations decay over a number of periods. As such, deviations that occur in a given year contain information about the future term as well.
Next, we estimate the accruals model. Following the literature, we estimate this model cross-sectionally for each year, each two-digit SIC code with at least 10 observations available.
We undertook both in-sample (using only our sample firms) and out-of-sample (using all firms in Compustat excluding our sample firms) estimation of model [2] . As our results are invariant to the estimation approach, we only report results based on the out-of-sample estimation as it allows preserving a greater number of observations for further analyses. That is, we first obtain parameter estimates of model [2] using all Compustat firms excluding our sample firms and then use these estimates to compute abnormal accruals in our sample as the difference between actual and expected total accruals. Table 3 reports the relative proportion of firm-years in each of our eight groups that encompass SEOs and firm-years that do not. Thus, firms across periods other than the years when an SEO is issued serve as our "typical" benchmark.
The Prevalence of Earnings Inflation Strategies at the Time of an SEO
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In SEO years, 20.1% of our sample firms fall into Group 3, that is, the group of firms exhibiting positive ROA surprises, abnormally low R&D expenditures, and abnormally high accruals. This proportion is significantly greater (p<.0001) than 9 We make use of a "typical" benchmark rather than a "naive" benchmark of equal proportions in each group to allow for a non-symmetric distribution of forecast errors across groups. We have also considered an alternative "typical" benchmark, i.e., all Compustat firms not issuing SEOs (as opposed to just our sample firms), and found the results in near-exact correspondence with those we report.
in non-SEO years, when only 13.7% of firms are categorized in Group 3. This 6.4 percent-point difference in the proportion of Group 3 firms represents approximately a 55% higher relative frequency in SEO years than in non-SEO years. This difference is consistent with a significant number of firms inflating earnings at the time of an SEO through a simultaneous reduction in discretionary expenditures and an increase in abnormal accruals. Group 4 also exhibits significant differences in the relative frequency of firms across the SEO and non-SEO years. The proportion of firms in Group 4, i.e., firms with a higher likelihood of having engaged in real activity management but not accruals-based earnings management, is 17.5% in SEO years compared to 14.6% in non-SEO years.
Group 1 includes firms that are likely to have overstated earnings via accruals alone; that is, these firms report positive earnings surprises along with positive abnormal accruals, but not negative abnormal R&D. Their incidence is relatively similar in SEO and non-SEO years, at 11.6% and 11.5% respectively. Group 2 includes firms that experience positive earnings surprises but are not likely to have either curbed their R&D expenditures or reported higher accruals. They constitute 10.1% in SEO years, significantly lower than the 13.5% in non-SEO years.
Groups 5-8 represent firms that did not generate positive earnings surprises at the time of their SEOs. Such firms generally appear less frequently during SEO years than during non-SEO years, with the exception of Group 7. Firms in group 7 likely manipulated R&D downwards and accruals upwards, but failed to generate positive earnings surprises. They comprise 13.1% of the sample of SEO years, versus 10.4% for non-SEO years.
In general, the evidence is consistent a greater propensity of firms to generate positive earnings surprises via real activities manipulation in SEO years (groups 3 and 4). Interestingly a common characteristic of all three groups that exhibit a higher prevalence in SEO years (groups 3, 4 and 7) is that they all report unusually low R&D.
Post-SEO Operating Performance
To assess the operating consequences of earnings inflation strategies, we examine the post-SEO ROA, adjusted for the ROA of their Barber-and-Lyon matched counterparts. Table 6 Interestingly, Groups 5, 7 and 8 also exhibit significant under-performance up to two years following the SEO, and the relative performance across all groups is generally negative; this indicates that operating under-performance (relative to matched firms) may be endemic for SEO firms.
Post-SEO Stock Price Performance
Under the null hypothesis stemming from the efficient markets, if earnings inflation strategies are transparent to investors, and stocks are priced adequately at the time of the SEO, future abnormal returns should not be statistically distinguishable from zero for Groups 1, 3 and 4 and indeed, for any of the eight groups. However, if the financial markets do not fully impound the effect of earnings inflation at the time of an SEO, but do so only after its effects are realized over subsequent periods, we expect firms engaging in earnings inflation to exhibit negative abnormal stock returns in the future. In other words, firms that inflate earnings at the time of an SEO through means that are not discernible to investors are overvalued.
The results for Groups 1 through 4 are presented in Table 5 We do not observe negative returns in the three years following an SEO for firms in Group 1; these firms are likely to have relied on accruals alone to inflate earnings. Median returns exhibit a pattern similar to that we observe with mean returns.
For completeness, Table 5 Panel B reports results for Groups 5 through 8. We expect the power of our empirical proxies to capture real and accruals manipulation undertaken to overstate earnings to be weaker among these groups, as they consist of firms that do not report positive earnings surprises. Largely, our returns based tests confirm this intuition: of the twelve group and post-SEO-year combinations that we report, only two exhibit significantly negative returns; they pertain to the second and third years after the SEO for Group 5 firms, and the significantly negative returns are not sustained in the third year after the SEO.
V. Sensitivity and Additional Analyses
Are Firms in Groups 3 and 4 Cash-Constrained?
As Table 3 demonstrates, all three groups that exhibit a higher prevalence in SEO years Table 6 shows that in the year of issuing an SEO, firms in group 3 are not any more likely to report negative cash flow surprises than positive ones; indeed, their composition is respectively 52.1% versus 47.9% of the group. Similarly group 4 is also less likely to consist of firms with negative size-adjusted abnormal cash flows than positive ones (50.2% versus 49.8%). Finally, the percentage of group 7 firms reporting negative cash flow surprises is 49.3%. Thus, it appears unlikely that firms in groups 3, 4 or 7 are more likely to be cash-constrained. In any case, the presence of cash constraints would not explain the negative future returns in each of the three years following an SEO that we observe only for Groups 3 and 4. Table 7 presents group survival rates in the three years subsequent to an SEO. Although differences in survival rates are not dramatically different initially, Groups 3 and 4 (positive earnings surprises along with abnormal R&D reductions) have among the lowest survival rates of all firm groups, with the exception of Group 8. As such, it appears that in addition to lower future ROA, we find that real activity manipulation also leads to lower survival probability; to that extent an investigation of operating performance understates the detrimental consequences of RAM.
Survival Rates
11
VI. Discussion of Findings
Our primary result, robust to various specifications is that SEO firms exhibit future negative abnormal returns when they report positive earnings surprises that are also accompanied by real activities management, specifically unusual reductions in R&D expenditures. Results with respect to accruals management are more mixed. We observe significantly negative future returns only when accruals management is also accompanied by R&D reductions to generate positive earnings surprises. This could possibly reflect the market's inability to comprehend the implications of accruals when manipulation of real activities is an obfuscating factor. Note that abnormal accruals accompanying RAM might in fact arise as a result of real activities (for example, R&D reductions that also lead to unusually low payables). Importantly, we observe negative future returns for firms that are likely to have inflated earnings via real activities but do not exhibit any evidence of accruals management. Thus, accruals management per se does not appear to be driving SEO overvaluation. Collectively, the results suggest that investors and other market participants do not necessarily fixate on earnings; rather, their ability to process earnings information and detect any manipulation is weaker when managers engage in more opaque strategies to inflate earnings.
11 Future abnormal returns of firms in Groups 3 and 4 would also have been more negative than those reported in Table  4 had we considered delisting returns for non-surviving firms.
VII. Conclusion
An SEO is an event where the firm's stock price is of particular interest to managers. The amount of capital collected by a firm at the time of an SEO depends on its stock price on the day of the offering. To the extent that stock valuations depend at least in part on reported earnings, managers (and current shareholders) have incentives to inflate earnings in order to maximize SEO proceeds and in the process, transfer wealth from future shareholders. However, an SEO also signifies a period of enhanced scrutiny of the firm and its financial statements, which possibly dissuades managers from attempts to inflate earnings. Reflecting these conflicting circumstances, the literature reports mixed evidence on overvaluation at the time of an SEO and its link to earnings management.
Managers can choose from a range of methods to inflate earnings. We reason that only those methods that are relatively more opaque are likely to escape detection under the scrutiny characterizing SEOs. Following recent literature, we recognize that earnings management can occur through two channels, accruals manipulation and real activities manipulation, and there are crucial differences between the two. Unlike accrual choices which are often guided by GAAP, there are no clearly established guidelines for real activities. Indeed, managers are expected to exercise their judgment in selecting their operational and investment strategies, making earnings management through real activities potentially less discernible to investors.
In identifying real manipulation, we focus on managers' incentives to reduce R&D expenditures, since such reductions can be detrimental for future competitiveness and profitability but can improve current earnings, profit margins and cash flow from operations. We observe that firms with positive earnings surprises and abnormally low R&D exhibit significantly negative post-SEO returns, consistent with these firms being overvalued at the time of the SEO. While our research design incorporates the possibility that managers may engage in accruals management, our results suggest that unusually high accruals are unlikely to be a dominant source of overvaluation at the time of an SEO.
Since real activities management is expected to be costlier for the firm, it may be natural to expect that managers attempt to accomplish earnings management via accruals before they engage in opportunistic real activities. The evidence in studies such as Badertscher (2011) is generally consistent with managers first exhausting or depleting their flexibility to maintain overvaluation via accruals management before switching to real activities management. Our paper suggests that at times of heightened scrutiny, managers can exhibit a preference for real activities manipulation strategies if they wish to inflate earnings, because such strategies have a higher probability of escaping detection.  g (k) * I(g) +  i+k , whereabnStkR i +k| is the k-period ahead (i.e., future multi-period) risk-adjusted cumulative stock return for firm i, with an SEO occurring at time , and I(g) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the firm is in Group g and 0 otherwise. We use Barber and Lyon (1997) matched-firm approach to compute abnormal stock return. Mean returns for each group are presented along with cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Median returns for each group are presented along with pvalue from non-parametric tests in parentheses. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<0.10.  g (k) * I(g) +  i+k , whereabnStkR i +k| is the k-period ahead (i.e., future multi-period) risk-adjusted cumulative stock return for firm i, with an SEO occurring at time , and I(g) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the firm is in Group g and 0 otherwise. We use Barber and Lyon (1997) matched-firm approach to compute abnormal stock return. Mean returns for each group are presented along with cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Median returns for each group are presented along with pvalue from non-parametric tests in parentheses. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<0.10. +  it , where CF it is the amount of size-adjusted cash flow for firm i at time period t, CF it-1 is its lagged value, Time(τ) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if year is t and 0 otherwise. This cash flow model indicates that cash flow depends on a firm-specific amount ( i ), the amount of cash flow in the previous period, and the economy-wide effects in year t (  ). We use Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
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